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The Courts' Inherent Power To Compel Legislative Funding of 
Judicial Functions 
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential 
in a limited constitution. 
-Alexander Hamilton* 
The recurrent fiscal crises that confront &tate and local govern-
ments exert serious budgetary pressure on the courts. 1 Although the 
judiciary consumes a very small proportion of public resources,2 an 
expanding judicial workload3 and lagging appropriations4 have sig-
nificantly impaired the operation of many court systems. 5 
Inadequate funding poses a potentially grave threat to the inde-
pendence of the judiciary and to the private law rights of individual 
citizens. Courts have responded to this potential threat by develop-
ing the doctrine of inherent power to compel appropriations from 
the other branches of government. 6 This theory has evolved from 
some earlier cases, which invoked the courts' inherent power to jus-
tify compelling appropriations for specified judicial needs, into a 
broader and more frequently invoked assertion of judicial auton-
• THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
l. See, e.g. , Dolan, Justice Delayed -As Funds Grow Short, Courts Around the U.S. Musi 
Appeal for Relief, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1983, at Al, col. 1. 
2. In 1965-1966, for example, the judiciary received 1% of the federal budget, 6% of state 
budgets, and 6.3% of county budgets. Saari, Open .Doors to Justice: An Overview of Financing 
in America, JUDICATURE, May 1967, at 296. 
3. See C. MANNING, JUDGESHIP CRITERIA (1973); Lawson & Gletne, Cutback Manage-
ment in the Judicial Branch: Controlling Costs Without Courting Disaster, 1 JUST. SYs. J. 44 
(1982). 
4. See, e.g., Brennan, Judicial Fiscal Independence, 23 U. FLA. L. R.Ev. 277, 280 (1971); 
Lawson & Gletne, supra note 3, at 44; Dolan, supra note 1. 
5. The very number of inherent power cases, see notes 7-8 and 11 infra, suggests the scope 
of the problem. A fiscal crisis can severely retard the functioning of a judicial system: 
The effect of all this upon the moral ~ic) of the court is obvious. Employees do not 
know from day-to-day wliether they have their jobs. The court is unable to implement 
docket control methods to decrease our backlog, and probation services are threatened, as 
are family counseling services. The Friend of the Court staff is so depleted that it cannot 
properly handle its important functions. Judicial efficiency is threatened by the loss of 
secretaries. Only three law clerks are available for the entire court. In short, this crisis has 
had and will have a devastating effect upon the delivery of proper judicial services. 
Gilmore, 17te Day the Detroit Courts Ran Out of Money, 19 JUDGES J. 36, 39 (1980). 
6. These cases typically involve city and county governments, charged by state legislation 
with at least a portion of the responsibility for funding the courts. See C. BAAR, SEPARATE 
BUT SUBSERVIENT: COURT BUDGETING IN AMERICA 6-7 (1975). At present, 27 states have 
assumed responsibility for financing the state courts. See Tobin, Managing the Shift to State 
Court Financing, 1 JusT. SYS. J. 70 (1982). 
This Note necessarily adopts general terminology to discuss issues common to the state 
court systems. "Legislature" or legislative branch" refers to the elected authority from whom 
the court seeks additional funding; the "constitution" refers to the state constitution. 
1687 
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omy.7 The doctrine has become well accepted in the cases,8 but has 
generated an extensive body of primarily .critical commentary.9 
Litigation results when the legislative branch contests the inher-
ent power order. Because judicial compulsion of legislative action 
must derive from constitutional authority, 10 and because of the prac-
tical and doctrinal challenges such litigation presents, many courts 
have struggled to resolve these cases in a principled fashion. 11 This 
Note defends the inherent power doctrine, but argues that current 
judicial approaches to its application have failed to confront 
7. For earlier cases, see, e.g., State ex rel Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 137 P. 392 
(1913); State ex rel Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 P.2d 689 (1902) (per curiam); Moyna-
han v. City of New York, 205 N.Y. 181, 98 N.E. 482 (1912);In re Janitor of Supreme Court, 35 
Wis. 410 (1874). 
8. Only the Supreme Court of Alabama has explicitly rejected the doctrine. See Morgan 
County Commn. v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 293 So. 2d 830 (1974). A few other courts have 
avoided the issue by resting a result on statutory grounds. See Young v. Board of County 
Commnrs., 9 Nev. 52, 530 P.2d 1203 (1975). 
An otherwise unanimous body of decision has upheld the existence of inherent power to 
compel appropriations. See, e.g., Deddens v. Cochise County, 113 Ariz. 75, 546 P.2d 811 
(1976); Millholen v. Riley, 211 Cal 29,293 P. 69 (1930); Wadlowv. Kanaly, 182 Colo.115, 511 
P.2d 484 (1973); People ex rel Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966); McAfee 
v. State ex rel Stodola, 258 Ind. 677, 284 N.E.2d 778 (1972); Webster County Bd. of Supervi-
sors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1978); Jefferson County ex rel Grauman v. Jefferson 
County Fiscal Court, 301 Ky. 405, 192 S.W.2d 185 (1946); O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the 
County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507,287 N.E.2d 608 (1972); Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne 
County, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d 436 (1969) (Black, J., concurring), revd on rehearing per 
curiam, 386 Mich 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972); 
State ex rel Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1970) (per curiam); Board of 
Commrs. v. Eleventh Judicial Dist. Court, 182 Mont. 463, 597 P.2d 728 (1979); Azbarea v. 
North Las Vegas, 95 Nev. 109, 590 P.2d 161 (1979); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 
(1966); In re Board of Commrs., 4 N.C. App. 626, 167 S.E.2d 488 (1969); State ex rel Lorig v. 
Board of Commrs., 52 Ohio St. 2d 70, 369 N.E.2d 1046 (1977) (per curiam); Commonwealth ex 
rel Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45,274 A.2d 193 (1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971); Commis-
sioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (dicta); Zylstra v. Piva, 85 
Wash. 2d 743, 539 P.2d 823 (1975); Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 569 (1974). 
9. See Brennan,supra note 4; Bukowsld,Inherenl Power of the Court-A New Direction?, 
54 Wis. B. BULL. 22 (1981); Burke, Tlte Inherent Power of the Courts, 51 JUDICATURE 247 
(1974); Carrigan, Inherent Powers and Finance, 7 TRIAL 22 (1971); Note, Judicial Financial 
Autonomy and Inherent Power, 51 CORNELL L. REv. 975 (1972); Constitutional Law: The In-
herent Power of the Courts to Appropriate Money far "Reasonably Necessary" Expenditures, 55 
MARQ. L. REv. 392 (1972); Comment, Inherent Power and Administrative Court Reform, 58 
MARQ. L. REv. 133 (1974); Comment, Courts - Judge's Power lo Bind Contractually County 
Treasury far Courtroom Necessities, 1 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1136 (1972); Comment, Stale Court 
Assertion of Power to Determine and Demand Its Own Budget, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1187 (1972); 
Comment, Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1236 (1972). 
10. The legislature, of course, has power to appropriate as it pleases unless constrained by 
the higher law of the Constitution. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803). This 
is especially important because the legislature's appropriations power itself derives from the 
Constitution. 
I 1. See, e.g., O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 287 
N.E.2d 608 (1972); Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 
(1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972); State ex rel Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 
S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1970) (per curiam); Commonwealth ex rel Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 
A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1970). This selection fairly represents the 
leading cases. 
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squarely the central issues raised by inherent power orders. The 
Note advocates an alternative procedure for defining the legitimate 
scope of judicial authority to compel appropriations on its own be-
half. Part I examines the constitutional basis of the doctrine, and 
concludes that although constitutional considerations justify the in-
herent power doctrine, they also require that the courts closely link 
the assertion of the doctrine to the constitutional imperatives that 
justify it. Part II examines the court's current approach to the review 
of inherent power orders, and argues that current procedures bear no 
rational relation to confining inherent power within its legitimate 
boundaries. Part III, therefore, proposes an alternative procedure to 
address directly, and overcome to the extent possible, the constitu-
tional, political, and practical problems created by assertions of judi-
cial power to compel appropriations. 
l. CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INHERENT JUDICIAL 
POWER To COMPEL APPROPRIATIONS 
A. Separation of Powers 
The federal and state constitutions embody a system of separa-
tion ofpowers.12 Constitutional separation of powers among legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial branches depends on two related 
concepts. The first is functional differentiation: no branch may 
usurp a function properly belonging to another. 13 The second is 
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 1, art. II,§ 1, art. III,§ 1. The separation of powers concept 
enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the Framers. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (J. 
Madison) (J. Cook ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 
1961). The Framers traced the idea to Montesquieu, but it derived from a more ancient heri-
tage. See ARISTOTLE'S PoLmcs, BOOK IV, ch. 14, at 154 (B. Jowett trans. 2d ed. 1931); J. 
LocKE, TREATISE OF CML GOVERNMENT AND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 97-99 
(Sherman ed. 1937); 1 B. DE MONTISQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Book XI, ch. 6, at 152 
(I'. Nugent trans. 1823). See generally Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 108 (1970); Fairlie, The Separation of Powers, 21 MICH. L. REv. 393 
(1922); Sharp, The Classical American .Doctrine of "Separation of Powers," 2 U. Cm. L. REv. 
385 (1935). 
2: 
Many state constitutions express the concept explicitly. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. II.,§§ 1-
Section 1. The powers of government of the state are divided into three separate 
branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. 
Section 2. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one of these branches, 
nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of 
the others. 
Such provisions invariably fail, however, to indicate the precise powers that "belong" to each 
branch. They thus beg the .question whether the appropriations power can, in extreme cases, 
"belong" to the judiciary. 
13. This differentiation cannot be absolute. To operate properly, and to perform their 
functions fully, each branch must engage in some activities constitutionally within the prov-
ince of the other branches. For instance, both the courts and the legislature must engage in 
some executive or administrative activities in performing their constitutional functions, and 
the executive and the judiciary must exercise some legislative power in making rules to govern 
the internal functioning of their branches. These activities are necessary to the ability of each 
branch to perform its functions, and are thus incidental powers each branch possesses. See C. 
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checks and balances: no branch should have the power to direct the 
course of government policy unchecked by the other branches. 14 
Constitutional power over taxing and spending lies with the leg-
islature, and, to the extent of the veto power, the executive. 15 Never-
theless, the exercise of the appropriations power may offend the 
separation of powers in either of two ways. First, if the legislative 
appropriations decision effectively disposes of matters before the ju-
diciary, the spending power will have swallowed the judicial power 
entirely. In such a situation, the legislature has usurped a judicial 
function, thereby offending the foundation of separate governmental 
departments. 16 
Second, below a certain level of financial support, the judiciary 
may lose the ability to check the other branches of government eff ec-
tively. In rare instances, the very existence of the judicial branch 
may become endangered, risking the complete collapse of the tripar-
tite structure.17 More commonly, dependence on the legislature for 
the means of operation may threaten the independence of the 
courts. 18 Judicial sensitivity to the appropriations problem might 
BAAR, supra note 6, at 155; J. CARRIGAN, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS 2-3 (1973); see 
also In re Salaries for Probation Officers, 58 N.J. 422,425,278 A.2d 417,418 (1971) ("But the 
doctrine of the separation of powers was never intended to create and certainly never did 
create, utterly exclusive spheres of competence. The compartmentalization of governmental 
powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches has never been watertight."). 
14. This aspect of the doctrine appears consistently in the statements of the Framers of the 
United States Constitution. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison). 
15. In/n re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232,552 P.2d 163 (1976), the Supreme Court of 
Washington described the "awkward position of courts in the governmental budgeting 
process": 
No authority rests in the judiciary to appropriate funds, as a legislative body does, nor 
to exercise the power of the veto as a bargaining device, as may the executive. In most 
states, its only means of direct participation in the budgeting process is by intervention, in 
the form of litigation, to compel the payment of funds for the court system. 
87 Wash. 2d at 237, 552 P.2d at 166. 
16. In Municipal Court Bloodgood, 137 Cal. App. 3d 29, 186 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1982), the 
state accounting office identified the following consequences of a new austerity budget on the 
courts: 
(l) Consolidation of all municipal court districts; 
(2) Virtual elimination of civil calendars; 
(3) Elimination of small claims court cases; 
(4) Cutbacks on the criminal misdemeanor calendar; 
(5) The closure of 22 separate courthouses; and 
(6) The resulting violation of several provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Penal 
Code, and Constitutional guarantees of due process. 
137 Cal. App. 3d at 36-37, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 810. If an appropriations decision results in the 
"elimination of civil calendars," or identifiable violation of state law, fiscal pressure rather 
than legal judgment has decided the cases. 
17. See, e.g., notes 5 & l6supra. 
18. The risk was prominent among the concerns of the revolutionary generation. See THE 
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 348-49 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961): 
It is equally evident that the members of each department should be as little depen-
dent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were 
the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the Legislature in this particu-
lar, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. 
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weaken the scrutiny applied to legislation of dubious constitutional-
ity, or tempt the courts to favor the legislature over the executive in 
cases of inter-branch dispute.19 Finally, even if the courts continue 
to function, at least nominally, and do not respond to any percep-
tions of legislative pressure, the judiciary may lose its ability to po-
lice the application of the law, thereby abrogating a judicial function 
to the executive. 20 
B. Limits to the Inherent Power Analysis 
The tripartite structure of government established by the consti-
tution provides a persuasive initial argument for the courts' current 
approach.21 But two related objections disturb the case for judicial 
power to compel appropriation. First, and fundamentally, does not 
the assignment of appropriations power to the judges itself offend 
the separation of powers? Second, and unavoidably, what are the 
limits of this inherent power? 
Modem courts do not discount this possibility. See, e.g., Carlson v. State ex rel Stodola, 
247 Ind. 631, 633-34, 220 N.E.2d 532, 533-34 (1966): 
It is axiomatic that the courts must be independent and must not be subject to the whim of 
either the executive or legislative departments. The security of human rights and the 
safety of free institutions require freedom of action on the part of the court. Courts from 
time immemorial have been the refuge of those who have been aggrieved and oppressed 
by official and arbitrary actions under the guise of governmental authority. It is the pro-
tector of those oppressed by unwarranted official acts under the assumption of authority. 
Our sense of justice tells us that a court is not free if it is under financial pressure, whether 
it be from a city council or other legislative body, in the consideration of the rights of 
some individual who is affected by some alleged autocratic or unauthorized official action 
of such a body. One who controls the purse strings can control how tightly those purse, 
strings are drawn, and the very existence of a dependent. Justice, as well as the security of 
human rights and the safety of free institutions requires freedom of action of courts in 
hearing cases of those aggrieved by official actions, to their injury. 
See also Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 40, 384 P.2d 738, 741 (1963) ("the courts must be 
independent, unfettered, and free from directives, influence, or interference from any extrane-
ous source"). 
19. See note 18 supra. This effect may operate either directly, or more subtly, as chronic 
judicial dependence results in attracting those least distrustful of and most deferential to, the 
legislator. 
20. The judges must pass upon search warrant requests, supervise the conduct of grand 
jury investigations, and conduct supression hearings. At a given extremity of fiscal pressure, 
these tasks are performed, if at all, in only a cursory fashion, leaving executive officials essen-
tially free of judicial oversight. 
21. A court might also ground an inherent power order on fourteenth amendment due 
process or its state constitutional counterpart, although no court appears to have taken this 
route. Superficial adjudication caused by underfunding might offend procedural due process 
standards by disposing of "life, liberty, or property'' without a meaningful hearing. Alterna-
tively, a court might deem access to a functioning judicial system an historically protected 
interest "fundamental" to the "concepts of ordered liberty," thus qualifying for substantive 
due process protections. 
This argument largely duplicates the separation of powers claim. To fulfill its constitu-
tionalfanction, the courts must have sufficient funds to adjudicate the cases brought before 
them. At the point where the courts, due to fiscal pressure, cease deciding cases according to 
the reasoned elaboration of the law (the core of either due process claim}, they have ceased 
also to be courts. See notes 25-28 i,ifra and accompanying text. 
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To be sure, inherent power necessarily confers on the judiciary 
some of the legislature's appropriations power.22 But the alternative 
permits the constitutional eclipse of the judicial branch. In resolving 
this dilemma, persuasive reasons justify favoring inherent power 
over limitless legislative discretion. 
First, the relative constitutional risks support inherent power. An 
inadequate legislative appropriation risks the autonomy, and per-
haps the functional existence, of the judicial department. By con-
trast, even a grossly excessive judicially ordered expenditure will do 
little to diminish the power of the legislature.23 Increasing the judi-
cial share of the local budget from, say, five to seven percent exerts 
relatively little impact on the appropriations power. Still less might 
such an increase threaten the autonomy or existence of the legislative 
or executive departments. But it may mean the difference between a 
court system that is capable of administering justice and one that is 
not. 
Second, the institutional role of the judiciary offers two reasons 
to entrust it with inherent power. First, the judicial function is to 
declare the rights of the parties according to the law.24 Judicial 
method resolves disputes not by weighing the returns to the judges, 
or by following individual intuition, but by exercising judgment de-
rived from accepted value premises.25 In the inherent power context, 
the issue is whether a particular appropriations statute off ends the 
constitutional separation of powers. Marbury resolved this issue at 
22. This is neither surprising nor unprecedented: 
It is the imperfection of human institutions which gives rise to our notion of inherent 
power. It is simply impossible for a judge to do nothing but judge; a legislator to do 
nothing but legislate; a governor to do nothing but execute the laws. The proper exercise 
of each of these three great powers of government necessarily includes some ancillary 
inherent capacity to do things which are normally done by the other departments. 
Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 383 Mich. 10, 20-21, 172 N.W.2d 436, 440 (1969), 
revd. on rehearing per curiam, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 
(1972). 
The Supreme Court has not hesitated to compel legislative appropriations in other contexts 
when the Constitution so required. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (wel-
fare residency test violates equal protection); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right 
to counsel for indigents in felony prosecutions). 
23. See note 2 supra and accompanying text (courts consume small percentage of public 
resources). 
24. This was the view of the Framers. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803). This corresponds with the duties of the other 
branches: the legislature establishes subconstitutional law; the executive enforces it. The judi-
ciary interprets and applies the law when litigants dispute its meaning in a particular case. 
25. See C. PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT (1980); Dworkin, The Forum of 
Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 517 (1981) ("Judicial review insures that the most funda-
mental issues of political morality will finally be set out and debated as issues of principle and 
not simply issues of political power, a transformation that cannot succeed, in any case not 
fully, within the legislature itself."). Even without any accepted connection between positive 
law and social values,judges will attempt to follow the law, if only to preserve their authority, 
See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 142-43 (1962). 
\ 
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the dawn of the republic.26 Insofar as "it is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," and 
insofar as the constitution is law, the responsibility for resolving the 
conflict between the statute and the constitution lies exclusiv~ly with 
the judiciary.27 The virtues of judicial review may be arguable, but 
the institution's existence is now practically secure, and reserves to 
the judiciary the final authority for constitutional interpretation.28 
But, it might be objected, a case in which the judicial branch has 
an important stake differs significantly from the ordinary case of ju-
dicial review. The objection is unfounded in light of the contempo-
rary critique of judicial review in general.29 Every case of judicial 
review directly involves the scope of judicial power. To point to in-
herent power cases as presenting a special issue of bias assumes that 
the temptation of power reaches its maximum force at the lowest ebb 
of power, that judges will more likely deviate from a fair interpreta-
tion of the constitution to secure a few dollars for probation officers 
than to constitutionalize passionate opinions about racial equality,30 
economic liberty,31 or abortion.32 In short, every constitutional case 
necessarily implies concomitant reduction or expansion in judicial 
power. The case for judicial review has prevailed despite this ele-
ment of judicial interest in constitutional controversies. Judicial 
temptation does not distinguish the inherent powers situation. 
Related to the normative method of judicial decisionmaking is 
the sheer political weakness of the courts: 
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power 
must perceive, that in a government in which they are separated from 
each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always 
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; be-
cause it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The execu-
tive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the 
26. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803). 
27. "Insofar as constitutional interpretation and adjudication of controversies are con-
cerned, it is for the judicial department to determine whether any department has exceeded its 
constitutional functions." Webster County Bd. of Supervisors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869, 873 
(Iowa 1978). 
28. Judicial review now rests not only on Marbury, or the arguments in THE FEDERALIST 
No. 78 (A. Hamilton), but "also on the visible, active, and long-continued acquiescence of 
Congress in the Court's performance of this function." C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELA-
TIONSHIP 1N CoNSTITUTlONAL LAW 71 (1969). Whatever the status of federal-state relations, 
that same acquiesence characterizes the approach of most state legislatures to judicial review 
by state courts. 
29. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST at 63-69 (1980) (judges usurp majority 
power whenever they wield constitutional authority based on perceptions of "fundamental 
rights"). 
30. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S 483 (1954); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles 
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. l "(1959). 
31. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
32. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo!ft A-Comment on 
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973). 
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community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but 
prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are 
to be regulated. The judiciary on the contrary has no influence over 
either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of 
the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. 
It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judg-
ment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm 
even for the efficacy of its judgments.33 
From the perspective of realpolitik, the judiciary offers the safest re-
pository for the extraordinary authority inherent in the choice. be-
tween the powers to compel a legislative appropriation or cripple 
another branch of government. Moreover, only through the confer-
ral of some such power can the judiciary gain a card to play in the 
effort to resolve a funding dispute without litigation.34 
Finally, these institutional aspects of the judicial function will 
contribute to the responsible exercise of the inherent power. The 
courts' most critical resource is their perceived legitimacy, a legiti-
macy directly implicated by inherent power orders. The judiciary 
has every incentive to preserve its perceived legitimacy by invoking 
the inherent power doctrine only when constitutionally required.35 
These institutional factors weigh heavily on behalf of resolving 
the inherent power dilemma in favor of the judiciary. But this does 
not justify the inference, drawn by too many courts, that the inherent 
power extends to the "reasonable" costs of court administration.36 
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
34. Judicial weakness also tends to deflect the argument that, even if the doctrine of inher-
ent power does not usurp legislative authority, it may remove an important check on judicial 
power. See Comment, Stale Court Assertion of Power to .Determine and .Demand its Own 
Budget, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1187, 1196 (1972). This argument assumes that judicial power is 
both dangerous and unchecked but for financial constraints. But, while all political power is 
dangerous, judicial power offers less of a risk than legislative power. Moreover, the selective 
process, whether elective, appointive, or mixed, offers an important check short of removal 
from office. 
Finally, the notion that the risks of judicial power justify manipulation of the court budget 
is simply misconceived. The judiciary, unlike the executive, has no role in the budget process, 
See note 15supra. Such a "check" against judicial activity, which can succeed only by bend-
ingjudicial interpretation of the law closer to the desires of the legislature, contradicts the very 
nature of the judicial function. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text. Thus, in con-
trast to the appointment process, the budgetary check is an illegitimate check on judicial 
authority. 
35. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The 
Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword - ultimately rests on sus-
tained public confidence in its moral sanction."). 
36. See O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507,510,287 
N.E.2d 608, 612 (1972) (inherent power protects courts "from impairment"); State ex rel 
Weinstein v. St Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Mo. 1970) (per curiam) (Court has inher-
ent power to hire "reasonably necessary'' employees); Commonwealth ex rel Carroll v. Tate, 
44 Pa. 45, 57, 274 A.2d 193, 199 (Court must prove appropriation is "'reasonably necessary' 
for its proper functioning and administration"), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971); McAfee v. 
State ex rel Stodola, 258 Ind. 677, 682, 284 N.E.2d 778, 782 (1972) (judges must limit their 
requests to those things reasonably necessary in the operation of their courts and to refrain 
June 1983] Note - Courts' Inherent Power To Compel Funding 1695 
Any compelled appropriation in excess of the constitutionally re-
quired minimum offends the legislature's appropriations power, be-
traying rather than fulfilling the separation of powers concept which 
justifies inherent power in the first instance. This discussion implies, 
then, that a court invoking the inherent power must (a) link each 
aspect of its order to a constitutionally required judicial function, 
and (b) offer objective findings of fact and conclusions of law in sup-
port of the constitutional connection. 
Many courts, of course, have expressed sensitivity to the limits of 
inherent power and the need for legitimacy in its application. Part II 
explores the current judicial approach to containing inherent power. 
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE INHERENT POWER DOCTRINE 
A. The Burden of Proof Approach 
While the practical and theoretical problems created by the in-
herent power doctrine have not led most courts to reject it, 37 some 
courts have sought means to avert or mitigate these dangers. A few 
courts have imposed exhaustion of remedies requirements38 or made 
approval of a superior authority within the court system a prerequi-
site to a funding order.39 Many courts, however, have relied primar-
ily on assigning the burden of proof, with varying evidentiary 
standards, to the court attempting to obtain the funds.40 
from any extravagant, arbitrary or unwarranted expenditures"). This standard reflects the pre-
dominant approach. 
Unfortunately, the "reasonable necessity" standard divorces the scope of an inherent 
power order from the constitutional doctrine justifying judicial exercise of the spending power. 
Constitutional separation of power principles either require a specific expenditure or they do 
not. What the trial judge believes to be "reasonably necessary" to the effective functioning of 
his court bears no inherent relation to the requirements of the constitution. Similarly, "im-
pairment" of a court's functioning is irrelevant because the prior, unimpaired functioning of 
the court may have been more or less than the constitution required. 
It might be objected that no certain line is possible in defining the minimum constitutional 
level of judicial functioning. But judges draw this line implicitly each time they invoke the 
inherent power doctrine, for that doctrine can extend no further than the minimum constitu-
tionally required judicial presence. See Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 57, 66 A.2d 577, 579 
(1949) ("Control of state.finances rests with the legislature, subject only to constitutional limi-
tations . . . .") ( emphasis in original). 
37. See note 8 supra. 
38. See O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 516, 287 
N.E.2d 608, 615 (1972); State ex rel Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Mo. 
1970) (per curiam); In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 250, 552 P.2d 163, 173 (1976). 
39. See O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507,516,287 
N.E.2d 608, 615 (1972); Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 386 Mich. 1, 9, 190 N.W.2d 
228, 242 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972); see also Burke, The Inherent Powers of the 
Courts, 51 JUDICATURE 247 (1974) (a highly favorable analysis of the procedure in Massachu-
setts); Connors, Inherent Power of the Courts - Management Tool or Rhetorical Weapon?, 1 
JusT. SYS. J. 63 (1974) (favorable discussion of O'Coin's). 
40. See, e.g., Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 154-56, 439 A.2d 638, 647-48 (1981); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 55, 274 A.2d 193, 199, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 
(1971); In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 250-51, 552 P.2d 163, 173-74 (1976). 
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This allocation of the burden of proof arguably exerts an impor-
tant restraining influence on the courts in several ways. First, a 
heavy burden of proof may discourage the exercise of inherent 
power in the first instance, limiting the doctrine's use to extreme 
cases of judicial necessity,41 where the case for the doctrine is strong-
est and public understanding of the need to divert scarce funds is 
more easily achieved.42 Second, allocating the burden to the courts 
tends to counteract the legislature's disadvantage of having to argue 
in a judicial, and possibly biased, forum.43 The reviewing court need 
not weigh the relative merits of the cases of the legislature and the 
lower court, but can focus exclusively on whether the court exercis-
ing inherent power has met its burden ofproof.44 Third, the burden 
of proof approach offers the rhetorical advantage of presenting the 
public with a judicial claim upheld after resolving doubtful issues in 
favor of the legislature.45 
B. Defects in the Burden of Proof Approach 
Part I concluded that constitutional principles justify inherent 
power to compel appropriations, provided that a constitutional basis 
exists for each aspect of the order and that the court acts legitimately 
in reaching its decision.46 The current burden of proof approach 
does little to further either criterion. 
I. Constitutional Basis 
Relying on the burden of proof to contain judicial power in the 
inherent power context obscures the fundamental question at issue 
in these cases, that is, what level of judicial functioning does the con-
stitution require?47 Instead of addressing this question directly, the 
courts' approach treats as a matter of evidence and proof what is 
ultimately a question oflaw.48 Rarely will a geniune dispute exist as 
41. See In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 249-51, 552 P.2d 163, 173-74 (1976). 
42. See In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d at 251, 552 P.2d at 172. 
43. See Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 155-56, 439 A.2d 638, 648 (1981), 
44. See Becken v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 155, 439 A.39 at 648. 
45. See In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d at 251-52, 552 P.2d at 174-75. 
46. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. 
47. The reluctance to face this question is understandable. The difficulty of drawing a 
clear line between constitutionally necessary and constitutionally unnecessary appropriations, 
however, is not diminished by side-stepping the issue. If anything, focusing on artificial analy-
ses increases the likelihood of inaccurately resolving this central question by ensuring that the 
courts avoid seriously considering it. A failure to face squarely this question is merely an 
unprincipled way to resolve the issue - it does not succeed in making the issue go away. See 
note 36 supra. 
48. The burden of proof means very little when the facts are not disputed. The coun must 
then resolve the legal issue, however difficult, not with reference to a standard of proof, but 
according to its best understanding of the law. A difficult legal issue, for example, does not 
preclude summary judgment if the facts are not in issue. See Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., 
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to what judicial services an additional fixed amount of money can 
buy.49 Rather, the dispute turns on whether the undeniable incre-
ment of services attributable to the funding forced by court order is 
necessary to the constitutional functioning of the judicial branch. 
If taken literally, the burden ofproofrequirement would amount 
to an entirely illusory limit on judicial power, for the factual conse-
quences of a given level of appropriations are susceptible to objec-
tive, conclusive proof. Conversely, if reviewing courts translate the 
rhetorical force of the burden of proof standard into an implied 
judgment that the constitution approves minimal levels of judicial 
functioning, the inherent power doctrine may do very little to protect 
the autonomy of the courts. In short, the burden of proof approach 
bears no rational relation to the fundamental issue of whether or not 
specific appropriations are necessary to the minimum constitution-
ally permissible judicial presence. 
2. Legitimacy 
A close analysis of the burden of proof approach also reveals that 
it offers little in the way of legitimate decisionmaking. If the review-
ing court in fact harbors a pro-judicial bias, this favoritism will ex-
press itself as easily in the conclusion that the lower court "met its 
burden" as in a finding that the lower court persuasively linked spe-
cific judicial functions threatened by low appropriation to the consti-
tutional requirement of an independent judiciary. Indeed, couching 
the inquiry in terms clearly unrelated to the issue can, once under-
stood, only contribute to the belief that the judiciary is exercising 
guile and not judgment. 50 
Given that the current focus on the burden of proof offers at best 
a misguided limit on the inherent power doctrine, Part III advances 
several procedures to improve the doctrine's practical application. 
529 F.2d 721, 728 n.13 (5th Cir. 1976). Thus, if both parties agreed that a given appropriation 
would not suffice to provide, say, a court stenographer, it would be unusual for a court to hold 
that the court below had introduced "clear and convincing proof' that stenographic records of 
judicial proceedings are essential to the constitutional functioning of the courts. Given its 
relative unimportance, the burden of proof in inherent power cases should rest with whatever 
party would otherwise bear it in an analogous civil case. Emphasizing this issue in inherent 
power cases serves only to divert attention from the underlying constitutional dispute. 
49. None of the cases cited in note 8, supra, for example, involved any issue as to how the 
denial of the appropriations sought by the judiciary would affect the services offered by courts. 
SO. Cf. Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 
MICH. L. REV. 604, 661-63 (1983) (Constitutional analysis should address underlying value 
judgments, rather than speak in a rhetorical code). 
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Ill. IMPROVED APPROACHES To IMPLEMENTING THE INHERENT 
POWER DOCTRINE 
A. Issuance of an Inherent Power Order 
Some jurisdictions have adopted common-sense procedures for 
the initial determination by a lower court that only an inherent 
power order can provide constitutionally necessary funds. First, ex-
haustion of established legislative procedures to obtain desired funds 
should precede any court order.51 Second, the judge considering an 
order should obtain the written approval of the chief judge of his or 
her court, 52 who should inform both the legislature and the state 
supreme court of the possibility that an order may issue.53 This pro-
cedure offers an initial check on the first judge's determination and 
informs the legislature specifically of the court's concern. Nor 
should such a procedure consume much time; excessive delays can 
do serious damage to the court system while an inherent power order 
waits in limbo. 54 
Once these preconditions to an order are fulfilled, and the initial 
judge resolves that an order remains necessary, the judge should is-
sue the inherent power order. The order should set forth specific 
findings of fact, identifying the judicial functions that will be fore-
gone absent specific increments of funding. The order should also 
include specific conclusions of law, indicating why each appropria-
tion ordered is required, either independently or in combination 
with other aspects of the order, by the constitution.55 
51. This requirement now seems well accepted. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 569, 586 (1974). 
52. See O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 516, 287 
N.E.2d 608, 615 (1972). 
53. The Michigan Supreme Court requires both notice and prior approval by the State 
Court Administrator before an inherent power order may issue. See Wayne Circuit Judges v. 
Wayne County, 386 Mich. 1, 9, 190 N.W.2d 228, 242 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972). 
54. See C. BAAR, supra note 6, at 147 ("A plaintiff court may not seek enforcement of a 
money judgement ~ic J, since the appellate court decision may come so late in the fiscal year of 
the original suit that the award could not be expended before the beginning of a new fiscal 
year."). 
55. Judge Adams adopted a similar approach in his separate opinion in Wayne Judges: 
I would use the inherent power of the courts only in those cases where it is essential to 
assure the continued existence or basic functioning of the courts. The test I would apply 
would be the ability of a court to operate as a court, not whether the court can operate 
more conveniently or expeditiously if it has some additional means to carry out its func-
tions. For example, a court stenographer is essential for the proper functioning of a court 
of record. If one were not provided, a court of record under its inherent power could 
supply one and compel the payment of an adequate salary. 
I cannot agree, however, that the law clerks, probationary officers or a judicial assis-
tant are so essential to the operation of the circuit court of Wayne county as to be a proper 
case for invoking the doctrine of inherent power of the courts. I agree that the courts 
would operate more efficiently if the judges were provided with law clerks, if the judges 
had adequate probation services, and if the court had a judicial assistant. In the case of 
probation officers, I would concede that the question is indeed a close one. But a line 
must be drawn and, as I have indicated, I would draw it narrowly. I am convinced that 
the courts will continue to function even if they are not provided with these services. The 
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One possibility for framing such an order, which deserves 
favorable consideration, is the appointment of a special master or 
referee to come to preliminary :findings of fact. 56 The master should 
be approved by both parties and command professional expertise in 
the needs of judicial administration. Such an independent fact-
finder should initially evaluate the consequences of granting or de-
nying the desired funding. This would include an analysis of the 
court's workload and comparative efficiency. The fact-finder should 
also enter findings on how the court will compare, in specific judicial 
functions, with courts in other jurisdictions, on the alternative as-
sumptions that the desired funds are or are not available.57 
B. Advantages of the Proposed Procedures 
1. Constitutional Accuracy 
In contrast to current approaches, these procedures would focus 
the reviewing court's concern directly on the difficult question of 
what judicial functions are constitutionally indispensable. This 
would enable appellate courts to develop a body of case law articu-
cost is not insignificant-at least $200,000 per year. Consequently, this case involves a 
direct confrontation between the inherent judicial power of the courts and the legislative 
power to make appropriations. One or the other must give. Under our theory of govern-
ment, the legislature or a subordinate legislative body has the power to appropriate for all 
branches of government. Both the executive and judicial branches are required to present 
their fiscal needs to the legislative branch for consideration by that branch and allocation 
of available funds to all three branches of government based upon a legislative decision. 
This is the process that should be followed here. 
383 Mich. 10, 43-44, 172 N.W.2d 436,450 (1969) (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part), revd on rehg. per curiam, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 
(1972). Other judges might reasonably decide that a court cannot "operate as a court" without 
extensive research assistance. But only by casting the issue in these terms can such issues be 
thoughtfully addressed. Only such a forthright approach to the question of what funds the 
constitution requires can maintain the necessary link between the courts inherent power and 
the constitutional principles from which that power derives. 
56. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PR.oc. ConE §§ 638-645.1 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. CML 
PR.Ac. LAW§§ 4301, 4311-4321 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1982); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.490. 
57. An increasing body of analysis of judicial funding and court management has come 
into existence in recent years. Financing studies of the courts of several states have been made. 
See Hoffman, Court Financing: An Overview and Assessment, 7 JUST. Svs. J. 6 (1982). These 
studies can be used to compare the level of funding in other jurisdictions with the level of 
funding provided to the court invoking the inherent power; they can also be used to compare 
caseloads. Some attempts at developing techniques to measure workload are being made, see 
H. LAWSON & B. GLETNE, WORKLOAD MEASURES IN THE COURT (1980). A variety of other 
articles on the administrative management of state trial courts are available. See, e.g., C. 
MANNING, JUDGESHIP CRITERIA: STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING THE NEED FOR AnDmONAL 
JUDGESHIPS (1973); L. BERKSON, S. HAYS, & S. CARBON, MANAGING THE STATE COURTS 
(1977); H. LAWSON & B. GLETNE, FISCAL ADMINISTRATION IN STATE-FUNDED COURTS 
(1981); R. TOBIN, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (Trial Court Management Series 1979); R. 
TOBIN, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (Trial Court Management Series 1979). With reference to 
courthouse facilities, see INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, EMERGING TRENDS 
IN COURTHOUSE PLANNING, DESIGN, ADMINISTRATION, AND FUNDING (1975). The ABA 
Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL 
COURTS (1976), provides guidance on levels of trial court performance. 
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lating the m1mmum content of a constitutionally viable judicial 
branch. The difficulty of the enterprise does not counsel against un-
dertaking it; appellate courts are uniquely qualified to render such 
constitutional judgments, 58 and judicial experience in other areas no 
less subtle or challenging confirms that workable standards are not 
impossible to formulate. 59 In any event, such an approach offers the 
best chance for preserving judicial autonomy with the least usurpa-
tion of legitimate legislative functions. In a world of imperfect insti-
tutions, achieving the best chance for the best outcome is not an 
inconsequential achievement. 
2. Legitimacy 
Delegating fact-finding responsibility to an impartial expert 
reduces the possibility of distorted decisionmaking due to judicial 
bias.60 Such a procedure also enhances the legitimacy of the result-
ing review by forcing the court to confront the constitutional conse-
quences of stipulated variations in judicial functioning. Surely 
addressing the real question, however difficult, reflects a deeper 
fidelity to the ideal of judicial method than the artificially confident 
resolution of an irrelevant question. By treating the issue as one of 
constitutional interpretation rather than of trial court discretion, ap-
pellate courts will not only cast the controversy in the terms of its 
ultimate issues; they will also confirm that the inherent power con-
troversy calls for the kind of judgments they alone are most qualified 
to make. 
CONCLUSION 
Legislative power over appropriations can threaten the institu-
tional autonomy of the judicial branch. This possibility fully justi-
fies a limited grant of inherent power to the courts, based on the 
constitutional provision for an independent judiciary. Consistent 
recognition that this power extends no further than the constitutional 
mandate which justifies it, and that the same principle of separation 
of powers is affirmatively offended by a further extension of judicial 
appropriations power, can ensure the principled and effective imple-
58. See note 27 supra. 
59. The courts must draw many such lines in the course of constitutional adjudication. 
When a court-appointed attorney fails to provide an indigent defendant t'jfeclive assistance of 
counsel; when a government interest becomes "compelling"; or when a government classifica-
tion becomes suspect, do not present fundamentally easier questions. But society charges the 
judges to do the best they can with such issues, in light of judgment and experience, rather 
than leaving such controversies to political resolution because of their moral difficulty. See 
Dworkin, supra note 25, at 516-18. 
60. A master's report will, typically, be subject to the objections of the parties, which the 
court must then resolve. But obtaining an independent assessment in the first instance mini-
mizes the chance that the courts will exaggerate their needs. 
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mentation of the doctrine. The failure to recognize this limit by con-
tinuing to disguise the ultimate issue can only erode both the 
constitutional system of separation of powers and the public's re-
spect for judicial legitimacy. 
